In the U.K., at least:
A key difference in the U.K. [rules of criminal procedure] is that the suspect is advised that his silence can be used at trial if he raises [at trial] something he would reasonably have been expected to say upon arrest. For example, an arrestee with a real alibi would be expected to say so immediately. A criminal who wants to concoct a false alibi needs to line up people willing to lie for him first. There is a logically valid inference from silence in that situation, and the trier of fact should be allowed to consider it.
I wonder if the U.K. distinguishes alibis that the defendant would have known about (e.g., he was on a date) from those that he could discover only later through diligence (e.g., a witness he doesn't know about saw him at the time of the crime at a different location).
Anyway, I'm inclined to think this is a bad rule, because there is an equally valid inference, one not nearly as salient to juries, that the silence was based on prudential reasons - namely, on the knowledge that even an innocent person intentionally cooperating with police to prove his innocence may well inadvertently provide information that is damaging to his case (propinquity to the crime, motive, opportunity, errors of fact that can be cast at trial as intentionally misleading, etc.). And defense counsel is going to have a very heavy burden dislodging juror intuitions that an accused who refuses to talk to the police must be hiding something.
(Via CrimProf Blog.)
